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PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS AFTER CONAGRA 
Steven Czak* 
 
This Note examines the continuing harms of lead-based paint and attempts 
by cities and states to hold manufacturers and distributors liable for 
abatement under the public nuisance doctrine.  Such suits have stretched 
traditional conceptions of public nuisance, particularly on the threshold 
issue of whether pervasive lead paint in residences infringes on a common 
right held by the public.  This Note reviews the major lead paint public 
nuisance cases from across the country.  The plaintiffs were unsuccessful in 
each case for a variety of reasons until ten California counties prevailed in 
People v. ConAgra in November 2017.  While subsequently reduced by the 
appellate court, and further reduced in a postjudgment settlement, the trial 
court initially awarded the plaintiffs a staggering $1.15 billion in abatement 
funds.  Across the six states that have adjudicated such cases, there exists a 
great discontinuity not only in outcome but also in the manner by which each 
state court reached its decision. 
This Note proposes that future state courts follow the approach taken by 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court in carefully adhering to the historical 
boundaries of public nuisance and deferring to the legislature when the 
amorphous tort is used as an attempt to remedy a complex social issue.  
Given that no common right exists among private homeowners to be free of 
lead paint, as traditionally conceived under the doctrine, the claim of public 
nuisance is simply inapposite.  ConAgra impermissibly expanded the bounds 
of public nuisance by finding a common right where none exists and should 
not be followed by future courts when adjudicating public nuisance claims. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This famous Dutch Boy Lead of mine 
Can make this playroom fairly shine 
Let’s start our painting right away 
You’ll find the work is only play1 
Almost a century ago, a child may have stumbled across this poem in a 
coloring book published by NL Industries, Inc. (NL), once a major producer 
of lead products.2  The pictures inside showed children sprucing up their 
playroom by painting with NL’s Dutch Boy White Lead paint.3  The 
advertisement’s message was apparent:  use NL’s lead paint products for 
interior painting, from walls to window sills and even cribs.  As if that were 
not obvious enough, the coloring book also encouraged children to give an 
attached coupon for Dutch Boy paint to their parents.4 
It is arguable whether NL knew at the time that its products could poison 
children.5  Today, however, there is no dispute about the life-altering harms 
of lead paint.  Even minimal lead exposure can stunt cognitive and behavioral 
 
 1. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 541 (Ct. App. 2017) 
(quoting NL Industries, Inc.’s 1929 “paint book” for children). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. at 533–34. 
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development in children and can lead to a host of ailments in both children 
and adults.6  In 2012, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
changed its benchmark “level of concern”—then at ten micrograms per 
deciliter of lead in the blood—to a “reference value” of five micrograms 
because “no safe blood level . . . has been identified.”7  Concurrently, the 
CDC shifted toward a policy of “primary prevention” for lead exposure, 
which encourages removing hazards before they can manifest into harms, as 
opposed to simply mitigating the harms by covering up the lead paint with 
new paint.8  Despite a federal ban on lead paint in 1978,9 millions of homes 
across the United States still contain the deadly toxin.10  At least four million 
children live in these homes today, with at least half a million of those 
between the ages of one and five experiencing blood lead levels that exceed 
the CDC’s threshold for recommending public health actions.11  For a 
product banned almost half a century ago, the dangers of residential lead 
paint remain substantial. 
Given the pervasiveness of the problem and the abatement costs borne by 
communities, a number of cities and states began bringing public nuisance 
suits in the early 2000s against lead paint producers for their promotion and 
creation of a public harm.12  Employing the public nuisance doctrine in the 
mass torts context was unheard of until only a few decades ago.13  However, 
following a massive settlement with the tobacco industry in 1998, negotiated 
under the threat of such novel claims, states felt empowered to sue 
corporations like gun manufacturers and lead paint companies for their roles 
in creating widespread public harms.14  Most of the cases against lead paint 
manufacturers and distributors have failed, though for a variety of reasons.15  
However, in November 2017, California’s Sixth Appellate Division upheld 
 
 6. Blood Lead Levels in Children, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/blood-lead-levels.htm [https://perma.cc/TB4J-
WWVK] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019); Lead Poisoning, MAYO CLINIC, https:// 
www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/lead-poisoning/symptoms-causes/syc-20354717 
[https://perma.cc/K6L9-TTL9] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 7. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC RESPONSE TO ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING PREVENTION 1–5 (2012), https:// 
www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/acclpp/cdc_response_lead_exposure_recs.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
BB3N-F3MD]. 
 8. See Blood Lead Levels in Children, supra note 6. 
 9. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing Lead-
Containing Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (2019). 
 10. Protect Your Family from Exposures to Lead, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/lead/protect-your-family-exposures-lead [https://perma.cc/245G-
REBR] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 11. Lead in Paint, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https:// 
www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/sources/paint.htm [https://perma.cc/4NRM-PC5M] (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 12. See Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 741, 770 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 743. 
 14. Id. at 743, 770. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
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key findings in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co.,16 in which ten 
counties prevailed under the public nuisance doctrine against three lead paint 
companies that had promoted the use of their products in the interiors of 
residential homes.17  The trial court ordered the defendants to pay $1.15 
billion in abatement costs,18 though the appellate court remanded for 
recalculation as it found the defendants liable for a shorter period.19  Both the 
California Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court denied the 
defendants’ writs of certiorari.20  The parties ultimately reached a 
postjudgment settlement in which the defendants agreed to pay the ten 
counties a total of $305 million, finally ending the nearly two-decades-long 
litigation.21 
The ConAgra decision may encourage similar lawsuits in states that have 
yet to address whether lead paint companies can be held liable under the 
public nuisance doctrine, as well as other suits that would seek to employ the 
theory in new mass harm contexts.22  As the Chamber of Commerce stated 
in its amicus brief supporting ConAgra in the company’s petition to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, “at least 80 new public nuisance cases of this sort have been 
filed by states and other government entities against American businesses, 
all seeking to impose sweeping liability based on similarly novel theories.”23  
Considering that tort law is almost exclusively state law, one can expect an 
even greater number of cases to be filed in states, like California, whose 
highest courts have tended to be more plaintiff-friendly in nontraditional tort 
cases.24  Indeed, only three months after ConAgra, the cities of San Francisco 
and Oakland filed a major public nuisance suit against five of the world’s 
largest oil companies, claiming that they heavily marketed and sold fossil 
fuels despite their knowledge that the fuels contributed to global warming.25  
The two cities allege that they have suffered substantial harms, particularly 
coastal flooding, because of the defendants’ actions over many decades.26 
 
 16. 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 17. Id. at 514. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 598. 
 20. Press Release, James R. Williams, Cty. Counsel, Office of Cty. Counsel, California 
Counties and Cities Announce Groundbreaking $305 Million Settlement of Landmark Lead 
Paint Litigation (July 17, 2019), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/cco/leadpaint/Documents/ 
July%2017%2c%202019%20Press%20Release%20-%20Settlement%20of%20Landmark% 
20Lead%20Paint%20Litigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4FE-AWZV]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America 
in Support of Petitioners at 13–14, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 377 
(2018) (No. 18-84) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. California has been a pioneer in tort law, especially where there is clearly a harm but 
it is difficult to hold defendants liable under traditional doctrines. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (adopting market share liability); Rowland v. Christian, 443 
P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (introducing a multifactor test to replace the traditional tripartite 
framework of premises liability). 
 25. California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 27, 2018). 
 26. Id. 
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While the tort element of causation is notoriously elusive,27 varies by 
jurisdiction, particularly between progressive and conservative states,28 and 
is partly responsible for the disparate outcomes in these lead paint public 
nuisance claims,29 there remains an even more fundamental question as to 
whether lead paint companies have infringed on a “public right.”30  Under 
the public nuisance doctrine, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
defendant unreasonably interfered “with a right common to the general 
public.”31  Rhode Island characterized this component as the sine qua non of 
any public nuisance claim, for, without it, the suit can only be brought as a 
private action.32  California in ConAgra clearly found that the public had a 
right to be free from lead paint in their homes as it interfered with their access 
to essential community resources;33 Rhode Island found the exact opposite.34  
Two other states—Illinois and Missouri—denied relief without expressly 
deciding whether a public right exists, as they found the claims insufficient 
on the basis of causation.35  Finally, Wisconsin allowed a jury to answer the 
question, which it did in the affirmative,36 while New Jersey simply accepted 
that a public right did exist because of a state statute declaring residential 
lead paint a public nuisance.37  However, in both states, the plaintiffs yet 
again failed.38  Across these six states, there now exists a wide range of both 
approaches and outcomes, including on the threshold requirement of the 
existence of a public right. 
This Note explores whether the public has a common right to be free from 
lead paint in their homes and whether communities should be able to recover 
abatement funds through nuisance claims.  Part I discusses the evolution of 
public nuisance from English common law through its historical applications 
in American jurisprudence.  This Part continues by discussing its relatively 
recent use in mass torts, with a particular emphasis on what constitutes a 
common right.  This Part then concludes by discussing the hazards of 
residential lead paint, examining why many states have employed the public 
nuisance doctrine against lead paint companies in an attempt to spread 
abatement costs. 
 
 27. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (1985). 
 28. See City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 114 (Mo. 2007) 
(explaining that the Missouri Supreme Court was unwilling to adopt a more flexible causation 
standard like California’s “substantial factor” test). 
 29. See infra Part II.B. 
 30. Just as most courts have done, this Note uses the terms “public right” and “common 
right” interchangeably. 
 31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 32. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 447 (R.I. 2008). 
 33. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 552 (Ct. App. 2017). 
 34. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d at 453. 
 35. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126, 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); 
Lewis v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869, 879 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); City of St. Louis v. 
Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 116–17 (Mo. 2007). 
 36. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 764 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
 37. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499 (N.J. 2007). 
 38. Id. at 505–06; NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d at 784. 
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Part II reviews the case law of a number of states where courts have 
adjudicated lead paint public nuisance claims.  It begins with an overview of 
the existing statutory landscape regarding lead paint abatement and then 
reviews the disparate analytical approaches employed by the courts of the six 
states and their divergent outcomes. 
Finally, Part III proposes a solution to these inconsistencies that calls on 
future state courts to follow the approach taken by the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court in closely observing the tort’s historical boundaries.  This analysis 
should lead other states to find that pervasive lead paint in private homes, 
while harmful and unfortunate, does not infringe upon a right held in 
common by the public. 
I.  PUBLIC NUISANCE:  FROM THE KING’S ROADS TO LEAD-BASED PAINT 
To understand why states have lodged public nuisance suits against lead 
paint manufacturers, it is necessary to understand both the specific harm that 
governments have sought to abate and the development of the cause of action.  
Part I.A provides background on the hazards of lead-based paint and its 
stubborn persistence in residences today.  Part I.B discusses the origins of 
nuisance actions, both private and public, at common law and the traditional 
application of public nuisance doctrine in the United States.  Part I.C then 
analyzes how and why local governments and states began employing public 
nuisance in the mass tort context a few decades ago, including against lead 
paint manufacturers. 
A.  The Harms and Pervasiveness of Lead-Based Paint 
Lead is an abundant, versatile heavy metal that mankind has employed for 
millennia.39  Since those earliest days, lead has been detrimental to human 
health.  The first known cases of lead poisoning date back over 2300 years to 
the Roman Empire, when lead was commonly used in water pipes and 
pottery.40  The problem became more prevalent during the Industrial 
Revolution as Western societies rapidly modernized and employed the metal 
in a vast array of new industries, like smelting and printing.41  With the 
advent of the automobile and lead-based gasoline in the early twentieth 
century, the presence of lead became ubiquitous.42  By the 1970s, the federal 
government finally recognized the serious health risks associated with lead 
exposure and took affirmative steps to reduce its use, including banning lead-
based paint and leaded gasoline.43  While undoubtedly positive steps, the 
 
 39. Shilu Tong et al., Environmental Lead Exposure:  A Public Health Problem of Global 
Dimensions, 78 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] 1068, 1068–69 
(2000), https://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78(9)1068.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCF9-
DURK]. 
 40. Id. at 1068. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1069. 
 43. See Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 100-572, 84 Stat. 2078 
(1971) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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bans came more than a century and a half after the scientific community 
recognized the dangers of lead, and almost a century after some European 
countries first implemented regulations to prevent lead poisoning.44 
Despite the actions taken decades ago, lead poisoning remains a major 
public health issue today.45  Common sources of lead include paint that has 
not been removed from older homes; soil, especially near industrial facilities 
that operate with lead; and lead pipes in water distribution systems.46  Less 
common sources include folk medicines, lead ammunition in firearms, and 
inexpensive toys or jewelry from underdeveloped countries.47  Dust is the 
most common means of lead exposure and is often created when lead paint 
deteriorates inside a residence, or from lead particles that are disturbed in the 
soil.48  Individuals can also ingest lead particles through the air or water.49  
For example, Flint, Michigan experienced a water crisis in 2014 and 2015 
when it began drawing water from a new source without using proper 
corrosion control.50  Lacking a critical protective chemical, when the water 
flowed to homes through the city’s antiquated lead pipes, it slowly ate away 
at the pipes, causing lead particles to be deposited into the water.51  In some 
instances, lead levels were hundreds of times higher than the government’s 
minimum safety levels.52  The catastrophe led Michigan to declare a state of 
emergency and activate its national guard to assist in distributing bottled 
water to residents.53  However, significant havoc had already been wreaked.  
One study found that the crisis led to a nearly 70 percent increase in the 
number of children under the age of five with blood levels greater than the 
CDC’s reference value.54 
The symptoms of lead poisoning generally do not become apparent until a 
person has already accumulated high levels of lead in her blood.55  In adults, 
elevated lead levels and lead poisoning can cause a variety of symptoms 
including high blood pressure, mood disorders, and memory impairment.56  
For those seeking to conceive, excessive lead levels can reduce sperm count 
 
 44. Tong et al., supra note 39, at 1068. 
 45. Id. at 1073. 
 46. Sources of Lead, N.Y. ST. DEP’T HEALTH, https://www.health.ny.gov/ 
environmental/lead/sources.htm [https://perma.cc/3KLQ-GTK6] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Terese M. Olson et al., Forensic Estimates of Lead Release from Lead Service Lines 
During the Water Crisis in Flint, Michigan, 4 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. LETTERS 356, 356 (2017). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (noting that the Environmental Protection Agency’s “action level” is 15 
micrograms per liter and that some findings in Flint exceeded 5000 micrograms per liter). 
 53. State of Emergency Declared in the City of Flint, CITY FLINT MICH., 
https://www.cityofflint.com/state-of-emergency [https://perma.cc/BMC8-77ZU] (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2019). 
 54. Hernán F. Gómez et al., Blood Lead Levels of Children in Flint, Michigan:  2006–
2016, 197 J. PEDIATRICS 158, 160 (2018) (providing quantitative data indicating that 3.7 
percent of this demographic had elevated blood levels in 2016 compared to 2.2 percent in 
2014). 
 55. Lead Poisoning, supra note 6. 
 56. Id. 
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or create abnormal sperm in men and can increase the chances of a 
miscarriage or stillbirth in women.57  In Flint, two researchers noted a 12 
percent decrease in the fertility rate, a 58 percent increase in the fetal death 
rate, and an overall decrease in health of newborns in the city as compared to 
the rest of the state during the time of the water crisis.58 
While the effects of lead poisoning in adults are serious, the hazards for 
children are even more pressing as their bodies are still developing, therefore 
posing potentially lifelong consequences.59  The American Academy of 
Pediatrics notes that lead exposure can damage a child’s nervous system, 
bring about behavior problems, and stunt cognitive development.60  
Specifically, children exposed to high concentrations of lead are much more 
likely to have “impaired verbal concept formation, poor grammatical 
reasoning, and poor command following.”61  Researchers have also noted an 
inverse relationship between blood lead levels and childhood IQ scores.62  
Not only are the harms in children more pronounced, children are also much 
more susceptible than adults to lead poisoning from lead-based paint.  As the 
appellate court in ConAgra reiterated from the evidence presented at trial, 
children “explore their environment with typical hand-to-mouth contact 
behavior” and learn quickly that “lead paint chips ‘taste sweet.’”63  Indeed, 
many of the earliest cases of childhood lead poisoning in the United States 
occurred when infants ingested flakes from the paint that lined their cribs.64  
During a Wisconsin trial in which the City of Milwaukee brought a public 
nuisance suit against a number of manufacturers, one expert witness testified 
that the first known case of childhood lead paint poisoning dates back to 
1914.65  In that instance, a young child suffered from seizures and fell into a 
coma after ingesting chunks of lead paint from his crib.66  More than a 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. Daniel S. Grossman & David J. G. Slusky, The Effect of an Increase in Lead in the 
Water System on Fertility and Birth Outcomes:  The Case of Flint, Michigan 1 (W. Va. Univ. 
Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 17-25, Aug. 7, 2017), https:// 
researchrepository.wvu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1017&context=econ_working-
papers [https://perma.cc/PCT2-FXW9 ]. 
 59. Jaime Raymond & Mary Jean Brown, Childhood Blood Levels in Children Aged <5 
Years—United States, 2009–2014, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP., Jan. 20, 2017, at 1, 
1, https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/66/ss/pdfs/ss6603.pdf [https://perma.cc/8W77-
WFL7]. 
 60. Lead Exposure in Children, AM. ACAD. PEDIATRICS, https://www.aap.org/en-
us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/lead-exposure/Pages/Lead-Exposure-in-
Children.aspx [https://perma.cc/BB9H-32M9] (last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 61. Lisa H. Mason et al., Pb Neurotoxicity:  Neuropsychological Effects of Lead Toxicity, 
BIOMED RES. INT’L, Jan. 2014, at 1, 4. 
 62. Gómez et al., supra note 54, at 158. 
 63. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 515 (Ct. App. 2017).  
See generally Scott Clark et al., Urban Lead Exposures of Children in Cincinnati, Ohio, 26 
CHEMICAL SPECIATION & BIOAVAILABILITY 163 (1991). 
 64. ConAgra, 227 Cal Rptr. 3d at 519–20. 
 65. City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., 762 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008). 
 66. Id. 
2019] PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS AFTER CONAGRA 1069 
century later, hand-to-mouth ingestion of lead paint chips is still the leading 
cause of childhood lead poisoning.67 
The government’s initiatives to reduce the presence of lead beginning in 
the late 1970s had definitive and positive effects, especially for those most at 
risk.68  In its most recent multiyear study conducted across approximately 
thirty jurisdictions, the CDC found encouraging data that average blood lead 
levels in children continue to decline.69  However, the hazards presented by 
lead have not been eradicated.  The same CDC report noted at least 75,000 
confirmed cases of elevated blood lead levels in children under the age of 
five in a single year.70  Given that the agency does not collect statistics from 
every state, in addition to complexities stemming from disparate approaches 
to screening and reporting in each state, one group of researchers has 
suggested that the CDC may only be capturing half of the actual number of 
children with elevated blood lead levels.71  Whatever the exact number, it is 
clear that lead continues to pose serious health risks for tens of thousands of 
young children today.72 
The Environmental Protection Agency warns those who live in a home 
built prior to 1978 that there is a “good chance” it contains lead paint.73  
Specifically, the agency estimates that 24 percent of homes constructed 
between 1960 and 1977, 69 percent constructed between 1940 and 1959, and 
87 percent constructed before 1940 still contain lead paint.74  According to a 
2011 study by the Department of Housing and Urban Development, this 
equates to approximately 37 million homes, of which more than 23 million 
contain lead paint in a deteriorated, dangerous condition.75  Of the nearly 
16.8 million households that have a child younger than the age of six, 21 
percent, or 3.6 million total, contain serious lead hazards.76  Less affluent 
households, including those receiving government aid, are “significantly 
more likely” to have lead hazards than affluent households.77 
One of the main reasons why lead paint continues to be so prevalent, 
despite having been banned nearly fifty years ago, is the high cost of 
 
 67. Raymond & Brown, supra note 59, at 6. 
 68. Id. at 6–7. 
 69. Id. at 6. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Eric M. Roberts et al., Assessing Child Lead Poisoning Case Ascertainment in the US, 
1999–2010, PEDIATRICS, May 2017, at 1, 1. 
 72. See At-Risk Populations, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/populations.htm [https://perma.cc/BEA4-P7AA] 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019). 
 73. See Protect Your Family from Exposures to Lead, supra note 10. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., AMERICAN HEALTHY HOMES SURVEY:  LEAD AND 
ARSENIC FINDINGS, at ES-1 (2011), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/AHHS_ 
REPORT.PDF [https://perma.cc/WKE8-LKNC]. 
 76. Id. at ES-2. 
 77. Id. 
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removal.78  To avoid removal costs, many homeowners choose instead to 
mitigate the risk by applying an encapsulant over the old lead paint to prevent 
it from deteriorating.79  These concerns about the costs of abatement and who 
should bear them lie at the heart of the divide over whether public nuisance 
law is a proper vehicle for communities seeking redress for the pervasive 
presence of lead paint.80 
B.  Public Nuisance at Common Law and Historically in the United States 
Public nuisance claims had not been lodged in the mass tort context until 
relatively recently.81  Part I.B.1 provides a general overview of both the 
private and public nuisance doctrines, including the requisite “common 
right” element for the latter type of claim.  Part I.B.2 then discusses the 
historical evolution of public nuisance and some prototypical cases to help 
define the tort’s traditional boundaries in American jurisprudence. 
1.  Absence of Precise Definitions 
In its simplest form, nuisance is not simply conduct or a condition, but 
instead an “invasion of an interest” held by private individuals or by the 
greater community.82  Developed as an outgrowth of the assize of disseisin 
in the thirteenth century,83 nuisance could be brought through one of three 
actions:  the assize of nuisance, the writ of nuisance, or criminal 
presentments.84  The line between civil and criminal was not clear, which is 
unsurprising as early common law was notoriously ambiguous about the 
difference between public and private wrongs.85  Regardless of whether the 
law originally treated it as a tort or a crime, nuisance was a necessary 
development in the early English legal system in that it filled the gap between 
disseisin, which protected against the wrongful dispossession of land, and 
trespass, which protected against the physical incursion of land.86  The initial 
differences are, however, important in the development of the modern 
distinction between public and private nuisance.  The latter tracks generally 
from the assize and writ of nuisance, while the former largely arose from 
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(Wolff, C.J., dissenting); In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 511–12 (N.J. 2007) (Zazzali, 
C.J., dissenting). 
 81. Gifford, supra note 12, at 741. 
 82. William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1004 
(1966). 
 83. See DAVID IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 98 
(2006); see also Prosser, supra note 82, at 997. 
 84. IBBETSON, supra note 83, at 99–101. 
 85. See id. at 1–2, 101. 
 86. See Prosser, supra note 82, at 997. 
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what were once considered criminal nuisances.87  Private nuisance was 
primarily concerned with protecting the property rights of an individual 
whereas public nuisance concerned behavior that was of an “antisocial” 
nature.88 
American jurisdictions have provided some clarity to the doctrine by 
introducing a number of necessary elements to both private and public 
nuisance.89  The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines public nuisance as 
“an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.”90  
Private nuisance, on the other hand, is “a nontrespassory invasion of 
another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.”91  A key 
distinction, therefore, is whether the right being disturbed belongs 
collectively to the community, or instead to an individual alone.  Only those 
whose rights are infringed by the nuisance may sue under the private 
nuisance doctrine.92  However, as a public right belongs to the community, 
either an individual alone, an individual representing the general public, or 
the sovereign itself may bring suit.93  An individual can seek abatement of 
the nuisance but must demonstrate a harm greater than the rest of the 
community to recover damages.94  A sovereign may only seek an abatement 
of the nuisance and not damages.95  In these latter situations, however, the 
line between “abatement” and “damages” can become hotly contested.96 
While these distinctions help to establish the boundary between public and 
private nuisances, defining a nuisance remains an ambiguous task.  As one 
treatise notes, “[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire 
law than that which surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’  It has meant all things to 
all people . . . from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in pie.”97  
Indeed, the rise of public nuisance claims in the context of mass tort litigation 
is inextricably linked with the tort’s amorphous boundaries.98  Whether 
defined by statute or case law, nuisance at common law and today is difficult 
to refine beyond the Latin maxim at its English roots:  “Sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas—‘So use your own property as not to injure 
another’s.’”99 
The difficulty of defining a “public right,” which is of course a necessary 
element of a public nuisance claim, further complicates the act of defining a 
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public nuisance.100  The Restatement identifies five categories of public 
rights:  public health, safety, peace, comfort, and convenience.101  It further 
explains that “[a] public right is one common to all members of the general 
public.  It is collective in nature and not like the individual right that everyone 
has not to be assaulted or defamed or defrauded or negligently injured.”102  
The categories offered in the Restatement, however, offer only the broadest 
boundaries of what specifically can constitute a public right.  Certain 
common rights, such as the rights to clean air and navigable waterways and 
roadways, are indisputable.103 
However, the task of defining a common right becomes more difficult 
when applying the concept to a situation not foreseen by the common law.  
For example, lead paint is an indisputable health hazard, especially to 
children.104  Its pervasive presence in residential homes is also 
uncontested.105  One could logically conclude that a major health risk, 
present throughout a substantial portion of the community, is an issue of 
public health, and that as such, homes free of lead paint should be seen as a 
“public right.”  Yet, as explored in Part II, most state courts are unwilling to 
codify this right without clear statutory guidance.106  This twofold difficulty 
in both defining what constitutes a common right for a public nuisance claim 
and what qualifies as a nuisance of either kind led one state supreme court to 
describe nuisance as a tort that “elude[s] precise definition.”107 
2.  Traditional Public Nuisance Claims 
Public nuisances were initially considered crimes against the crown.108  
This is perhaps because the doctrine was first employed in suits to protect 
property that was used by all but owned by the monarch, such as the king’s 
highways, or because of the fear that a public nuisance could easily lead to a 
disturbance of the peace, including by those who would seek to rectify the 
nuisance without the assistance of the law.109  The first statute known to 
address public nuisances, enacted in 1389, stated, “If anyone cast dung etc. 
into Ditches, Water etc. which are next to any City, Borough or Town, he 
who will may sue forth a writ directed unto the Mayor or Sheriff or Bayliff 
of such Town etc.”110  The City of London similarly prohibited acts such as 
burning improper fuels, putting waste in the streets, and maintaining animals 
to the irritation of others.111  Other examples of public nuisances included 
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lotteries, “smoke from a lime-pit,” interfering with a market, diverting water 
from a mill, and even “unlicensed stage-plays.”112  With the exception of the 
plays and lotteries, such actions almost certainly would be considered public 
nuisances in most American jurisdictions today.113 
Most states have adopted statutes defining public nuisances and providing 
a cause of action for those affected.114  These statutes largely mirror concepts 
of public nuisance as developed at English common law.  California, for 
example, codified a public nuisance right of action in its civil code in 1872.115  
The statute defines nuisance as “[a]nything which is injurious to health, 
including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is 
indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of 
property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or 
property.”116  A public nuisance specifically is something that “affects at the 
same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable 
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted 
upon individuals may be unequal.”117  The statutes of other states are very 
similar in that they sketch the boundaries of public nuisance broadly.118 
In addition to these general definitions of nuisance, some states have gone 
one step further in declaring certain specific conditions, actions, or harms as 
public nuisances.119  Most of these statutes reflect the traditional conceptions 
of the tort, for example, by declaring whorehouses,120 obstructions to public 
paths,121 and the locations of illicit drug distribution to be public 
nuisances.122  This statutory approach of broadly defining public nuisance 
and perhaps deeming certain specific conditions as public nuisances is a 
reflection of the tort’s evolution in American jurisprudence, as it has come to 
be used as a means of rectifying both harms considered proactively as well 
as those not specifically proscribed but nonetheless in need of abatement.123 
Until the 1970s, public nuisance claims brought under either the common 
law or broad nuisance statutes in American courts largely mirrored situations 
considered by the English centuries ago.  For example, in 1899, a New York 
appellate court ruled in favor of a plaintiff who brought a public nuisance 
claim seeking damages for injuries sustained to his wagon that occurred as a 
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result of the defendant leaving logs in a road for at least five days.124  The 
court explained that obstructing a public highway was an obvious public 
nuisance and that the failure of the defendant to mitigate the problem in a 
reasonable period of time made him liable to anyone “suffering special 
damage.”125  This case is a perfect example of the ability of private citizens 
to bring public nuisance actions and seek damages when they suffer a harm 
greater than the rest of the community126 and reflects the origins of the public 
nuisance doctrine.127 
More common than an individual bringing a public nuisance claim, 
however, is when a public entity brings suit to abate a nuisance.  In 1903, for 
example, Yuba County, California sued Kate Hayes Mining Company 
seeking to enjoin the defendant from continuing to dump minerals from its 
mine into a local creek and river.128  The county prevailed at trial by proving 
that mineral deposits were collecting and causing the water beds to rise, 
thereby making flooding more frequent and more destructive.129  The 
California Supreme Court affirmed the injunction, finding that the 
defendant’s conduct clearly constituted a public nuisance as it placed a 
substantial amount of property at risk of ruin should the dumping continue 
unabated.130 
Communities have also used public nuisance claims to abate activities in 
breach of the public’s contemporary standards of decency and morality.  In 
1947, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s decision to prohibit 
the Ha Ha Club, a local night club, from continuing performances that were 
allegedly conducted in a “nasty, suggestive and indecent manner.”131  The 
club’s performances included acts by men impersonating women, as well as 
skits and jokes that were “lewd, indecent, [and] obscene.”132  The Florida 
Supreme Court took the opportunity to wax poetic about the value of the 
public nuisance doctrine: “There is no greater impediment to mass virtue than 
a ration of filth . . . .  This is the theory on which laws for the abatement of 
nuisances of this kind are promulgated and enforced.”133  The court had no 
difficulty finding that the salacious activity breached the community’s 
standards of morality, and as such, constituted a public nuisance that was 
proper for abatement.134 
The three cases above are typical of public nuisance claims historically 
brought in the United States.135  Each involved the infringement of a 
cognizable common right, whether that of public convenience, public safety, 
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or public morals.  A clear link from the nuisance to the harm suffered 
provided relief in the form of damages or abatement, the latter of which was 
limited to mitigating an obvious harm in a specific location.  The relative 
simplicity of these traditional public nuisance suits would disappear as public 
entities began to employ the theory in new contexts nearly fifty years ago.136  
Harms were not as clear and took longer to manifest,137 narrow geographic 
boundaries became a secondary issue,138 and the key question of whether a 
public right even existed became hotly contested.139 
C.  Public Nuisance in Mass Torts 
The tort of public nuisance has awakened from a centuries-long slumber.  
Traditionally regarded as “a species of catch-all low grade criminal 
offense” and as part of “the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law,” public 
nuisance has emerged during the past several years as a conspicuous 
weapon—albeit with inconsistent results—in the arsenal of states and 
municipalities.140 
Until only a few decades ago, American public nuisance cases reflected 
those found historically in English common law.  However, in the 1970s and 
’80s, plaintiffs’ attorneys began to push the traditional boundaries of 
nuisance, as the tort was vaguely defined and provided a means of avoiding 
potentially fatal shortcomings of other torts, such as statutes of limitations 
and the inability to recover for purely economic losses.141  While the results 
of this strategy were mixed, the use of public nuisance doctrine in mass torts 
is unlikely to cease anytime soon.142  Whether as a means of addressing the 
opioid crisis,143 gun violence, or the hazards of lead paint, states and 
communities have come to view public nuisance as an avenue of resolving 
serious social health and safety issues.144 
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One of the earliest mass harm public nuisance suits was lodged by a single 
plaintiff who sought to represent more than seven million citizens of Los 
Angeles County against hundreds of defendants allegedly emitting harmful 
pollutants into the atmosphere.145  In affirming the dismissal of the case in 
1971, the California appellate court noted that “[t]he plaintiff has paid the 
court an extravagant compliment in asking it to supersede the legislative and 
administrative regulation in this critical area, but the trial judge showed the 
greater wisdom in declining the tender.”146  The case is an outlier in that it 
attempted to solve a massive social problem and was lodged by an individual, 
not a public entity.147  More common in this early stage of the development 
of modern public nuisance law were attempts by communities to recover 
from asbestos manufacturers the costs associated with removing the harmful 
product from schools and other public facilities.148  These cases, too, were 
unsuccessful, often because the court was unwilling to allow the plaintiffs to 
use nuisance as an end run around products liability law.149 
Tobacco litigation took a slightly different path in that public nuisance 
claims brought by states evolved as the product of decades of unsuccessful 
suits by individuals.150  In 1994, the attorney general of Mississippi filed an 
action against the tobacco industry that included a public nuisance claim.151  
Within three years, forty other states filed similar cases, many of which 
included the novel theory of public nuisance.152  It is by no means clear that 
these claims would have succeeded at trial.  Seeking to avoid potentially 
devastating judgments, the tobacco industry instead settled with the states to 
the tune of $206 billion.153  Thus, while never adjudicated, the tobacco 
litigation was nevertheless a “formative period” for the public nuisance 
doctrine, as public entities came to understand the broad scope of the tort and 
its potential power over massive industries in combating serious public 
policy issues.154 
Since the settlement with the tobacco industry, cities and states have 
lodged public nuisance claims against a variety of other industries that have 
somehow contributed to mass public harm.155  These include suits against 
gun manufacturers for their role in America’s endemic gun violence,156 oil 
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companies for their contributions to global warming,157 and pharmaceutical 
companies for their role in the opioid crisis.158  The first major trial in this 
latter context recently resulted in a judgment against Johnson & Johnson for 
$572 million.159  And for the past two decades, local and state governments 
have filed major public nuisance suits against lead paint manufacturers in six 
different states.  The respective state courts have employed different 
approaches to adjudicate these cases, particularly on the existence of a 
common right, that expectedly has led to unequal results.160 
II.  A COMMON RIGHT TO LIVE IN LEAD-FREE HOMES? 
State courts have had difficulty defining the boundaries of public nuisance 
in new contexts,161 which has unsurprisingly led to “strikingly inconsistent 
conclusions” across the country when novel public nuisance claims arise.162  
Those inconsistencies are apparent both on the issue of whether the presence 
of lead-based paint in private residences infringes upon a common right and 
on the method by which respective courts have answered that question.163  
Part II.A discusses federal and state legislative attempts to mitigate the harms 
of lead paint.  Part II.B reviews those state courts that avoided answering the 
question of whether a public right existed because of the plaintiffs’ inability 
to satisfy the causation element of the claim.  Part II.C analyzes the disparate 
decisions of courts that adjudicated claims primarily by relying on the 
common law and broad statutory definitions of nuisance.  Finally, Part II.D 
discusses a single case wherein the court relied heavily on a specific state 
lead paint statute to resolve the issue. 
A.  Federal and State Efforts to Mitigate 
Recognizing the serious risks to public health posed by lead poisoning, the 
federal government and most state governments have passed legislation 
seeking to combat the presence of lead paint in American homes.  Congress 
passed the first federal legislation, the Lead-Based Paint Poisoning 
Prevention Act164 (LBPPPA) in 1971 and expanded it two decades later with 
passage of the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 
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1992165 (RLPHRA).  The LBPPPA provided grants to study the effects of 
lead exposure from a variety of sources, including paint, and also directed 
the secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development to 
promulgate regulations to mitigate the harms of lead paint in federal 
housing.166  Only a few years later, the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, convinced of the serious harms of lead-based paint, banned the 
product, effective February 1978.167  The RLPHRA further shifted the 
federal government’s policy from mitigation to elimination of lead paint 
hazards168 by directing multiple agencies to develop comprehensive plans for 
greater public awareness.  Efforts included mandatory disclosures during 
sales of houses with lead paint, better inspection and risk assessment 
programs, and abatement plans for eradicating lead paint.169 
Following the example set by the federal government, nearly every state 
passed legislation aimed at combating the serious risks of lead.170  When 
New Jersey’s legislature passed its Lead Paint Act, it noted that lead 
poisoning was “the most prevalent environmental health problem facing 
children in [the state].”171  Similarly, the Rhode Island Supreme Court noted 
in its public nuisance opinion that the state’s capital is pejoratively 
nicknamed “‘the lead paint capital’ because of its disproportionately large 
number” of childhood lead cases.172  Most states,173 including all of those 
whose courts have adjudicated lead paint public nuisance claims,174 require 
that when a proper public entity, such as the local health department, finds 
hazardous lead conditions on a property, its owner is responsible for abating 
the risks.175  However, the courts of these states have varied in how great an 
 
 165. Pub. L. No. 102-550, tit. X, 106 Stat. 3897 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of the U.S.C.). 
 166. In re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 491 (N.J. 2007). 
 167. Ban of Lead-Containing Paint and Certain Consumer Products Bearing Lead-
Containing Paint, 16 C.F.R. § 1303 (2019). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 4851a (2012). 
 169. Id. §§ 4852b–4852d. 
 170. See Lead Hazards Project, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 29, 2017), http:// 
www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/lead-hazards-project.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/QG48-KFNF] (compiling lead paint statutes from forty-four states and the 
District of Columbia). 
 171. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2Q-1 (West 2019). 
 172. State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 436 (R.I. 2008). 
 173. Lead Hazards Project, supra note 170. 
 174. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 105256 (West 2019); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/9 
(2019); MO. REV. STAT. § 701.308 (2019); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 2019); 23 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 23-24.6-23 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 254.166 (2019). 
 175. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/9 (2019) (“(1) If the inspection report identifies a 
lead hazard, the Department or delegate agency shall serve a mitigation notice on the property 
owner that the owner is required to mitigate the lead hazard, and shall indicate the time period 
specified in this Section in which the owner must complete the mitigation.  The notice shall 
include information describing mitigation activities which meet the requirements of this Act.  
(2) If the inspection report identifies a lead hazard, the owner shall mitigate the lead hazard in 
a manner prescribed by the Department and within the time limit prescribed by this Section.”); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 24:14A-8 (West 2019) (“When the board of health having primary 
jurisdiction hereunder finds that there is a lead-based paint hazard on the interior walls, 
ceilings, doors, floors, baseboards or window sills and frames of any dwelling or any exterior 
2019] PUBLIC NUISANCE CLAIMS AFTER CONAGRA 1079 
emphasis they place on these statutes with respect to lead paint compared to 
general statutes defining public nuisance and the common law of nuisance.176 
B.  Skirting the Difficult Question 
Courts in two states avoided clarifying the threshold issue of whether lead 
paint in homes interferes with a common right by instead finding that the 
plaintiffs failed on the element of causation.  Part II.B.1 discusses two cases 
from Illinois and Part II.B.2 reviews the single lead paint public nuisance suit 
from Missouri. 
1.  Illinois 
In the early 2000s, appellate courts in Illinois reviewed two cases 
involving public nuisance claims against lead paint manufacturers and trade 
associations.177  In the first action, Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass’n,178 three 
plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all children in the state exposed to 
lead paint for damages arising from “the costs of all medical screenings, 
assessments, and monitoring.”179  In the second, City of Chicago v. American 
Cyanamid Co.,180 the state’s largest city brought suit as a public entity 
seeking abatement of the pervasive lead paint in its homes.181  In both 
instances, the trial court dismissed the case at the pleadings stage and the 
appellate court affirmed.182  On the narrow issue of the existence of a 
common right, the courts took slightly different approaches to reach the same 
conclusion.183 
In the putative class action, the appellate court simply recognized that the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the existence of a public right.184  
Specifically, it accepted without any analysis the allegation that the 
promotion, manufacturing, and distribution of lead-based paint “exposed all 
children in [the] state to the risk of lead poisoning,” thus infringing on the 
common rights of public health and safety, two of the five categories of 
common rights highlighted by the Restatement.185  However, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of the public nuisance claim because the plaintiffs 
 
surface that is readily accessible to children and further finds a person occupying or using such 
dwelling is an unequivocal case of lead poisoning or at high risk of lead intoxication as defined 
by department regulation it shall at once notify the owner that he is maintaining a public 
nuisance and order him to remediate the nuisance . . . .”). 
 176. See infra Parts II.B–D. 
 177. City of Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Lewis v. 
Lead Indus. Ass’n, 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 178. 793 N.E.2d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
 179. Id. at 871. 
 180. 823 N.E.2d 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). 
 181. Id. at 128–29. 
 182. Id. at 128; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 875. 
 183. See Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d at 131–32; Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 877–78. 
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failed to identify the specific defendants who caused the distinct harm to each 
plaintiff—a critical requirement for the causation element of the claim.186 
The fact that the court did not challenge the existence of a common right, 
and specifically affixed it to categories discussed in the Restatement, may 
have seemed promising to future plaintiffs, with the important caveat that the 
case was only in the pleadings stage.187  Only two years later, another 
division of the same appellate district reviewed the City of Chicago’s 
nuisance claim against lead paint manufacturers.188  This time, however, the 
court would offer more on the issue of common rights given that, in the 
interim, the Illinois Supreme Court had issued a major ruling in another 
public nuisance case.  In City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,189 the city, 
again as plaintiff, filed a nuisance claim against gun manufacturers for their 
contributions to the city’s pervasive violence.190  The Illinois Supreme Court 
began by declaring the elements required of a public nuisance claim:  (1) a 
public right, (2) a substantial and unreasonable interference of that right, (3) 
proximately caused by the defendant, and (4) which inflicted injury.191  As 
to the critical threshold issue of what constitutes a common right, the court 
accepted the Restatement’s broad categories.192  However, while the court 
acknowledged that the public has a general right to safety and peace, relying 
on the state’s precedent in nuisance cases, it was unwilling to recognize that 
gun manufacturers had infringed on that right by lawfully selling weapons.193  
In carefully crafting the definition of the asserted common right in 
controversy, the court was “reluctant to state that there is a public right to be 
free from the threat that some individuals may use an otherwise legal 
product . . . in a manner that may create a risk of harm to another.”194  
Undergirding its decision was a policy concern that such recognition would 
constitute an “unprecedented expansion of the concept of public rights,” a 
common retort among courts in lead paint nuisance claims.195 
Instead of simply accepting the plaintiff’s allegation that a public right 
existed, the appellate court, hearing Chicago’s appeal in American Cyanamid 
Co., engaged in a more searching inquiry.196  Relying on the Restatement, 
state law precedent, and Beretta, the court doubted whether the plaintiff 
sufficiently pled this first critical element.197  While it acknowledged that 
public nuisances can be present on multiple private properties, it seemed to 
 
 186. Lewis, 793 N.E.2d at 878. 
 187. Id. at 871. 
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2005). 
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accept the defendants’ argument that lead paint only becomes a hazard when 
it deteriorates—a condition within the control of individual property owners 
and therefore outside of the scope of traditional public rights such as 
highways, waterways, and clean air.198 
Nevertheless, the court avoided definitively ruling on the common right 
issue.199  Instead, it assumed the existence of a public right and affirmed the 
lower court’s dismissal given that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege 
factual causation.200  As in Lewis, the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy traditional 
but-for causation was fatal.201  Importantly, the court also declined the city’s 
attempts to overcome this hurdle by accepting an alternative approach to 
causation, such as market share liability.202 
While the Illinois courts have not ruled authoritatively on whether lead 
paint in homes infringes upon a public right, there is clearly skepticism, 
especially following the state supreme court’s decision in Beretta.203  More 
important, however, is the process by which the two courts approached the 
issue.  In each instance, the courts relied almost exclusively on the 
Restatement and state precedent.204  Interestingly, neither court looked to 
Illinois’ Lead Poisoning Prevention Act205 or its public nuisance statute206 to 
guide its analysis.207  Instead, both courts skirted the issue by focusing on the 
element of factual causation and concluding that the plaintiffs could not 
succeed under the state’s traditional but-for standard.208 
2.  Missouri 
In January 2000, the City of St. Louis filed an action against numerous 
lead paint manufacturers asserting eight tort claims, including one for public 
nuisance.209  The city alleged that it was among the top ten U.S. cities in 
number of children suffering from elevated blood levels and that the problem 
persisted because more than 90 percent of all homes in the city were 
constructed prior to the federal government’s ban on lead paint.210  The city 
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sought compensation for previous and future abatement efforts.211  After the 
trial court granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion, the city 
appealed.212 
The Missouri Supreme Court narrowly rejected the public nuisance claim 
by a 4-3 vote.213  As with the Illinois appellate courts in Lewis and American 
Cyanamid Co., the court found that the city failed to allege sufficient facts to 
satisfy actual causation.214  Relying heavily on one of its decisions from the 
mid-1980s215 in which it rejected alternative standards of actual causation for 
products liability claims arising out of the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES), the 
majority took the opportunity to reemphasize that Missouri would not adopt 
a more malleable causation standard as proposed by the city and as adopted 
by jurisdictions like California.216 
The court’s focus on causation muddled the answer as to whether it 
believed a public right existed in the first place.217  The majority’s only 
substantive discussion of public nuisance doctrine was to note that the city’s 
claim actually appeared to be a private tort action seeking recovery for 
cleanup costs.218  As noted earlier, while private parties may recover 
damages through a public nuisance action, public entities may only seek 
abatement.219  However, aside from this distinction, the majority did not 
discuss the public nuisance doctrine any further.220  As with the courts in 
Illinois, it looked neither to the state’s Lead Abatement and Prevention of 
Lead Poisoning Act221 nor its public nuisance statutes222 to aid its analysis.  
The simple fact that the city could not satisfy traditional but-for causation 
allowed the court to avoid the deeper questions about public nuisance and 
common rights.223 
Three justices of the Missouri Supreme Court dissented.224  Chief Justice 
Michael Wolff, who authored the dissenting opinion, argued that requiring 
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the city to identify the specific defendant whose product was used in each 
particular residence defied the purpose of the public nuisance doctrine.225  
Drawing on an analogy embedded in the common law conception of public 
nuisance, Wolff struggled to see how the defendants’ conduct in selling a 
hazardous product that continued to inflict harm was different from a group 
of defendants dumping toxic sludge into a stream.226  The community-wide 
harm suffered because of the defendants’ conduct should have only required 
plaintiffs to identify the lead paint manufacturers that contributed to that 
harm, not to engage in a case-by-case identification of which defendants’ 
products were used in which homes.227  Such a high bar for causation in 
public nuisance cases, Wolff feared, would transform the tort into a mass 
harm class action in which members would still be required to prove 
individual injury.228 
Chief Justice Wolff also raised arguably the most important policy 
consideration underlying the entire claim and others like it, a point largely 
ignored by both the majority and the Illinois courts.229  Cities such as St. 
Louis had and were continuing to expend substantial sums of money230 to 
mitigate the hazard of residential lead paint, a problem that they did not 
create.231  In his eyes, such a costly decision was undoubtedly worthwhile, 
as cities could not “continue having the brains of many of its children 
permanently dulled by lead poisoning.”232  But should cities not have an 
avenue for recovering those expenditures?233  While the chief justice viewed 
the judiciary, and specifically the public nuisance doctrine, as a means to 
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provide relief, at least two other state supreme courts have explicitly rejected 
such a responsibility as outside of the scope of their authority.234 
C.  Proceeding on the Common Law 
Contrary to the approach taken by Illinois and Missouri, the courts of three 
other states actually answered whether there exists a public right to be free 
of lead paint in homes by relying on the common law and broad public 
nuisance conceptions.235  Part II.C.1 discusses the intricate history of lead 
paint cases in Wisconsin as well as the recent California judgment in 
ConAgra.  In both states, the plaintiffs prevailed on the existence of a public 
right.236  Part II.C.2 analyzes how the Rhode Island Supreme Court found 
that no public right exists and that the amorphous boundaries of public 
nuisance could not replace clear legislative guidance on a major public policy 
issue.237  Furthermore, it explores how the court rejected the proposition that 
pervasive lead paint in private homes could constitute an infringement of a 
public right as conceived in the public nuisance doctrine.238 
1.  Public Right Found 
In a series of cases in Wisconsin and California, public entities were 
successful in their arguments that lead paint in private homes infringed upon 
a common right.239  In the former, the plaintiffs still ultimately failed on their 
public nuisance claim,240 while, in the latter, the plaintiffs succeeded and did 
so with a substantial judgment in their favor.241 
 a.  Wisconsin 
Of the six states in which public entities brought public nuisance claims 
against lead paint companies, Wisconsin’s case history demonstrates the 
greatest interplay between the courts and the legislature.  There, plaintiffs 
came close to prevailing on their public nuisance claims given that the courts 
crafted a flexible definition of the tort.242  However, concerned with the 
policy implications of using public nuisance doctrine in place of products 
liability and negligence actions, especially against manufacturers for 
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decades-old, once-legal activities, the legislature stepped in to eradicate any 
chance that other plaintiffs could succeed in the future.243 
The litigation began in 2001 when the City of Milwaukee filed numerous 
claims, including a public nuisance action, against two lead paint 
manufacturers for their role in creating a public health hazard.244  The city 
alleged that, in the few years preceding the filing of the case, almost 20,000 
children had suffered from lead paint poisoning.245  That translated into an 
average of 16 percent of children across the entire city, including 26.4 percent 
in its urban areas and up to 63 percent in the most heavily impacted areas.246  
The trial judge granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of the 
public nuisance claim given the plaintiff’s inability to satisfy causation; the 
city appealed.247 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court, finding that 
there were genuine disputes of material fact.248  While most of its opinion 
focused on causation, the court also defined the necessary elements of a 
public nuisance claim, something which had been lacking in the state’s 
jurisprudence.249  Yet, on the issue of a common right, the court offered little 
guidance.250  For example, it recited a list of factors from a previous case that 
could be used in evaluating whether an activity or condition constituted a 
nuisance, the last of which was “the degree or character of the injury inflicted 
or right impinged upon.”251  However, nowhere in the opinion did the court 
explain what constituted a public right.  Instead, the court held that the 
general question of the existence of a public nuisance, which inherently 
incorporates the existence of some public right, was one for the jury.252 
On remand, the parties proceeded to trial, during which the city presented 
evidence substantially similar to what would be successful years later in 
ConAgra.253  The jury found in a special verdict that while the presence of 
lead paint in homes across Milwaukee was a public nuisance, specifically 
because of the health hazards to children, the defendants were not the legal 
cause of the nuisance.254  Again, the city appealed, claiming a number of 
errors in jury instructions; however, the appellate court affirmed the trial 
decision.255  Given the basis of the appeal, the court again did not provide 
any further clarity on the appropriateness of lead paint public nuisance claims 
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nor on the more narrow issue of common rights as a necessary element of 
such claims.256 
At the same time that the suit by the City of Milwaukee bounced between 
the trial and appellate courts, another lead paint case made its way to the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court.  In September 1999, J. Steven Thomas, by his 
guardian ad litem, filed a negligence suit against his landlords and multiple 
lead paint manufacturers for serious developmental issues arising from his 
ingestion of paint chips as an infant.257  However, as evidenced by the public 
nuisance cases brought by St. Louis and Chicago, the inability to satisfy 
traditional but-for causation was potentially fatal to his claim.258  Drawing 
on the solution crafted for a parallel problem in the DES litigation of the 
1980s, the Wisconsin high court decided to extend the risk contribution 
theory to lead paint cases, thereby alleviating plaintiffs of the burden of 
identifying specific manufacturers.259 
The Wisconsin legislature, however, was displeased with the ruling, 
viewing it as an “improperly expansive application of the risk contribution 
theory of liability.”260  A few years after the decision, and under a new 
governor, the legislature passed a law that seriously curtailed the breadth of 
the risk contribution theory and eliminated it as an alternative to but-for 
causation in lead paint cases.261  Among the legislature’s greatest concerns 
were the social and economic consequences of imposing liability on 
companies for once-legal activities undertaken decades ago,262 a common 
retort among state courts that denied relief in public nuisance claims.263  
Therefore, while primarily focused on the element of causation, the new law 
also imposed a twenty-five-year statute of limitations for a variety of claims 
against lead paint manufacturers, distributors, and promoters, including 
claims for public and private nuisance.264  Given that the statute of limitations 
ran from the product’s date of sale,265 and because the federal government 
had banned lead paint more than twenty-five years earlier in 1978,266 the law 
effectively immunized former lead paint companies from liability and 
prevented any further claims against them. 
The history of lead paint litigation and the legislative response in 
Wisconsin offers two potential takeaways for navigating the current disparate 
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landscape of lead paint public nuisance cases.  First, one potential solution to 
resolve the existence of a common right is to simply ask the jury whether a 
public nuisance exists,267 as answering so affirmatively inherently requires 
also finding the existence of a common right.268  This approach, however, is 
uncommon, as in every other state this threshold question is one for the 
court.269  It also deprives courts in public nuisance suits of their historic 
“gatekeeper” role meant to ensure that the tort is not used improperly.270  
Second, state legislatures can, and perhaps should, decide whether or not to 
extend public nuisance doctrine to include lead paint claims.271  Legislatures 
are better suited to balance costs and benefits on social issues than are 
courts.272  Clear statutory guidance would also provide the judiciary greater 
clarity in adjudicating claims of such an amorphous tort.273  However, while 
such legislative action would be helpful, it is important to remember that 
public nuisance is a valuable remedy precisely because it can be employed 
to rectify harms not considered by the legislature.274 
b.  California 
Of all the lead paint public nuisance cases across the country, in only one 
did the plaintiffs succeed both on the existence of a common right and on the 
overall nuisance claim.275  Initially filed in 2000, People v. ConAgra Grocery 
Products Co.276 had a lengthy and complex history, with opinions at all three 
levels of the California judiciary over almost two decades.277  In its final 
form, the case involved ten plaintiffs, all California counties, that lodged a 
single claim of public nuisance against five former manufacturers of lead 
paint.278  Judge James Kleinberg of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County 
presided over a bench trial that lasted for six weeks in the summer of 2013.279  
On January 7, 2014, he issued a 114-page decision in which he found three 
of the five companies liable for creating a public nuisance by promoting the 
sale of lead-based paint and ordered them to pay $1.15 billion in abatement 
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funds.280  Three years later, the Sixth Appellate District largely affirmed the 
ruling, although it did order a recalculation of the abatement funds;281 both 
the Supreme Court of California282 and the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied certiorari.283  On remand in September 2018, the trial court 
reduced the total abatement payment from $1.15 billion to $409 million.284  
Finally, in July 2019, the parties reached a postjudgment settlement of $305 
million,285 which, while only a quarter of the original award, is not 
insubstantial. 
At both the trial and appellate levels, each court accepted that the public 
possessed a common right to be free of lead-based paint in their homes.286  
However, neither court, despite decisions of considerable length, spent much 
space discussing the critical threshold issue.287  Both relied exclusively on 
the state’s public nuisance statute288 to easily find that the public did indeed 
possess a common right to be free of lead paint in their homes.289  The 
flexible definition of a common right in the statute allowed the trial court to 
characterize the public right at issue as one “to be free from the harmful 
effects of lead in paint.”290  The appellate court described the common right 
more broadly, adding that pervasive lead paint “threatens the public right to 
essential community resources,” specifically residential housing and 
associated resources “like water, electricity, natural gas, and sewer 
services.”291 
The tort of public nuisance is purposefully broad to protect against harms 
that cannot be proscribed proactively.292  As such, the doctrine affords the 
judiciary substantial discretion in adjudicating public nuisance claims,293 
including the element of a common right.294  That discretion has traditionally 
been tempered in American jurisprudence as courts have employed a strict 
gatekeeping role.295  However, the defendants in ConAgra charged that both 
the California trial and appellate courts failed to exercise that 
responsibility.296  In reaching their conclusion that the public possessed a 
common right to be free of lead paint in their homes, neither court looked to 
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the broader history of the tort nor the traditional kinds of common rights 
protected under the public nuisance doctrine.297  By relying exclusively on a 
broadly worded statute, the courts found a public right not traditionally 
conceived by the doctrine.298  While the public has a common right against 
interference with their collective health, the lead paint was pervasive in 
private homes, not public buildings or public housing, and was put there by 
individual homeowners.299  The Restatement300 and numerous courts have 
warned that the aggregation of individual harms cannot equate to the 
interference of a common right,301 which is arguably what the California 
courts found.302 
Some scholars are concerned that ConAgra will invite public entities to 
wield the public nuisance doctrine as a powerful weapon against 
businesses.303  Already, two California cities have cited the case in their 
public nuisance suit against oil companies for their contribution to global 
warming.304  Even more worrisome, these scholars fear ConAgra’s broad 
conception of common rights, if followed, would mean “the concept of a 
public nuisance claim would be subject to no meaningful restriction and 
would swallow virtually all tort law.”305  Though it is only a single case, a 
recent judgment for the state of Oklahoma against Johnson & Johnson for its 
role in the opioid crisis lends some credence to these warnings.306 
For their part, the plaintiffs in ConAgra argued that these concerns are 
unfounded.307  First, they argue that the case will not promote a flood of new 
litigation, as the underlying basis for the decision was laid in 2006 and there 
had been no spike in public nuisance suits since.308  Second, while they 
acknowledged that public nuisance is conceived broadly, especially in 
California, public nuisance also has a number of safeguards to prevent it from 
becoming abused, primarily that suits are brought by politically accountable 
officials who can only seek equitable abatement, not damages.309  Though 
diametrically opposed in their predictions, neither the plaintiffs nor the 
 
 297. People v. ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co., 227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499, 551–52 (Ct. App. 
2017); People v. Atl. Richfield Co., No. 1-00-CV-788657, 2014 WL 1385823, at *8 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 26, 2014). 
 298. Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 5–
8, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 377 (2018) (No. 18-84) [hereinafter 
Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars]. 
 299. Id. at 8. 
 300. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979). 
 301. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1115–16 (Ill. 
2004); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 448 (R.I. 2008). 
 302. See Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 7–8. 
 303. Id. at 21. 
 304. California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 17-06011 WHA, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 n.2 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 27, 2018). 
 305. Brief of Distinguished Legal Scholars, supra note 298, at 7–8. 
 306. See Hoffman, supra note 143. 
 307. Brief in Opposition at 34–38, ConAgra Grocery Prods. Co. v. California, 139 S. Ct. 
377 (2018) (No. 18-84). 
 308. Id. at 35. 
 309. Id. at 36–37. 
1090 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
scholars are clairvoyants; the reality of a new legal landscape will likely not 
become apparent until more time has passed. 
2.  No Public Right Found (Rhode Island) 
In 1999, the attorney general of Rhode Island initiated a public nuisance 
suit against multiple former lead paint manufacturers and a trade association 
that once promoted the product.310  Seven years later, State v. Lead Industries 
Ass’n311 finally went to trial.312  In what would become the longest civil trial 
in the state’s history, the jury returned a verdict for the state.313  Two years 
thereafter, the Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed the judgment on a 
number of grounds, including in its finding that there is no common right of 
the public to live in lead-free homes.314 
Unlike other courts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court began with an 
expansive history of public nuisance and its origins in the English common 
law315 and its evolution in the state’s jurisprudence.316  Recognizing that the 
common law must reflect societal changes, the court warned of revolutionary 
measures that would destroy carefully crafted legal principles.317  Instead, 
the law should evolve “gradually and incrementally and usually in a direction 
that can be predicted.”318  With those cautionary words, the court then 
analyzed the elements of public nuisance claims under Rhode Island law.319 
On the threshold element of a public right, which it identified as the sine 
qua non of any public nuisance suit,320 the court reflected the same 
skepticism as the Illinois Supreme Court in Beretta.321  Individualized harms 
in the aggregate cannot equate to the infringement of a common right as 
traditionally conceived under the public nuisance doctrine.322  While mass 
injuries, like those arising from lead paint, affect a large number of 
individuals, public rights are more than simply the total of private harms.323  
Instead, they are “indivisible” and shared by the entirety of society.324  
Therefore, the state’s argument that lead paint interfered with the health of 
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the general public, while factually true, was not legally sufficient for the 
purpose of a public nuisance claim.325  Citing the Restatement and nuisance 
cases from across the country, the court reflected a conception of public 
rights that mirrored that of its English common law origins.326  To hold that 
lead paint infringed upon some common right would be to create a right 
where none exists and, more concerning, would create a precedent that any 
mass harm could fall under the public nuisance doctrine.327  As no common 
right existed, the court held that the trial judge should have dismissed the suit 
from the outset.328  Of all the courts to adjudicate lead paint public nuisance 
claims, this focus on the critical threshold issue of the existence of a common 
right was arguably the most faithful to the common law and the most efficient 
approach in evaluating the novel claims. 
The Rhode Island Supreme Court was conscientious throughout its opinion 
in repeatedly tempering expectations about the role of the judiciary in 
tackling social issues.329  While entirely sympathetic to the grave health 
problems still inflicted by lead paint,330 the court would not allow public 
nuisance to be stretched in such a manner as to upend the tort itself.331  Doing 
so, the justices feared, “would be antithetical to the common law and would 
lead to a widespread expansion of public nuisance law that never was 
intended.”332  In the array of remedies available to both private citizens and 
public entities, the body of tort law requires that distinct torts remain separate 
and not subsume one another.333  To allow recovery, the court cautioned, 
would mean the creation of bad laws,334 something, it noted, Edmund Burke 
once warned constituted “the worst sort of tyranny.”335 
D.  Adjudicating Claims with Legislative Guidance (New Jersey) 
Of all the lead paint cases brought under a public nuisance theory, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in In re Lead Paint Litigation336 relied 
most heavily on the actions the state legislature had already taken to address 
the problem.  The litigation began in 2001 when the City of Newark sued 
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multiple lead paint manufacturers on a variety of claims ranging from fraud 
and civil conspiracy to public nuisance.337  Twenty-five other cities, towns, 
and boroughs across the state brought their own similar suits shortly 
thereafter.338  A single transferee judge assigned to manage all of the cases 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
“proverbial Gordian Knot” of claims and characterizing their nuisance theory 
as being contrary to the state’s statutes, constitution, and precedent.339  The 
appellate court reversed and remanded the public nuisance claims, finding 
that the trial judge erred in concluding that the state’s lead paint statute 
precluded the communities from bringing a public nuisance claim against the 
defendants.340  Indeed, the court found that litigation may actually foster the 
same objectives as those pronounced by the legislature in providing another 
mechanism to abate lead paint in residences.341  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court granted review explicitly to resolve uncertainties surrounding public 
nuisance actions.342 
Similar to the Rhode Island Supreme Court,343 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court began by providing general background information on the theory of 
public nuisance and pronounced broad boundaries of the tort that mirrored 
those of the Restatement.344  The court then turned to one of the most 
contentious issues in the litigation:  whether a state statute precluded, 
encouraged, or had no effect on the right of public entities to bring public 
nuisance suits.345  Specifically, the New Jersey legislature declared that lead 
paint in a hazardous state inside private homes constituted a public 
nuisance.346  While the court expressed doubts about whether the 
legislature’s use of the term “public nuisance” meant that it also implied a 
common right against residential lead paint,347 it was clear that the legislature 
had already decided that abatement was the responsibility of individual 
homeowners.348  Further, the statute developed a comprehensive program to 
abate and eradicate lead paint from residences through the use of grants and 
low-interest loans funded, in part, by sales taxes on paint products.349  The 
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plaintiffs argued that the legislative actions did not preclude a public nuisance 
claim.350  However, the majority, in a split decision, saw these efforts as 
dispositive.351  In engaging in the inherently legislative function of allocating 
costs and developing a holistic approach to a serious social problem, the court 
remarked that the legislature did not intend “to sanction a tort-based theory 
of recovery.”352 
Even in the absence of such legislation, the majority would have still found 
that the plaintiffs could not prevail on their public nuisance claim.353  First, 
the majority viewed the “abatement” sought by local communities as a mask 
for damages,354 a concern similar to that of the Missouri Supreme Court.355  
Second, the majority saw the true underlying claim as one rooted in products 
liability, not public nuisance.356  Finally, as with the Rhode Island Supreme 
Court,357 the court warned that conflating distinct torts would have disastrous 
consequences for the entire body of tort law.358 
Two justices disagreed with the majority’s conclusion.359  In his dissent, 
Chief Justice James Zazzali argued that the legislature’s actions on the 
important social problem did not preclude a public nuisance suit.360  In fact, 
the statute and the lawsuit together sought to tackle “the same evil.”361  Tort 
law, he argued, was the mechanism by which private citizens, including 
through their elected officials, could seek corrective justice,362 and it was the 
judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that it modernized with societal 
changes.363  On the threshold issue of a common right, however, he offered 
only that the public has a “right to be free from the harmful effects of lead 
paint.”364  Like Chief Justice Wolff in Missouri,365 Chief Justice Zazzali 
recognized that these lead paint public nuisance suits were truly about who 
should bear the costs of abatement.366  However, he did not explain further 
how the toxin in private homes violated some common right held by the 
public as a whole.367 
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The majority in In re Lead Paint Litigation shared the fears of the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court.368  While sympathetic to the harms stemming from 
lead paint, it was concerned that allowing the public nuisance claim to 
proceed would “stretch the concept of public nuisance far beyond recognition 
and would create a new and entirely unbounded tort antithetical to the 
meaning and inherent theoretical limitations of the tort.”369  And given its 
emphasis on acts by the state legislature to address the problem, of all the 
courts to adjudicate lead paint nuisance claims, it was most leery of the 
judiciary overstepping its boundaries.370 
III.  AVOIDING THE CONAGRA APPROACH TO PUBLIC NUISANCE 
As the New Jersey chief justice explained in his dissent, lead paint public 
nuisance litigation is fundamentally about who should bear the costs of 
mitigating the serious health hazards of pervasive lead paint—manufacturers, 
or homeowners and taxpayers.371  However, as the amicus brief in support of 
ConAgra’s petition to the Supreme Court warned, there is great fear among 
some in the legal community that stretching the traditional boundaries of the 
public nuisance doctrine to allow recovery will lead to an explosion of 
lawsuits that would upend the entirety of tort law.372  The polar positions in 
many ways reflect the disparate analytical approaches and conclusions of the 
courts in the six states which have heard such cases, particularly on the issue 
of the existence of a common right.373  In adjudicating public nuisance cases 
in novel contexts, courts should follow the approach of the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court by carefully ensuring that the plaintiffs prove that the 
supposed nuisance is infringing upon a right truly held in common by the 
public.374  Part III.A argues that there is no common right to be free of lead 
paint in private residences.  Part III.B posits that the solution for widespread 
social harms like pervasive lead paint should be the responsibility of 
legislatures, not the judiciary. 
A.  No Public Right to Lead-Free Homes Exists 
ConAgra wrongfully created a common right where none exists.  Pervasive 
lead paint, while harmful both individually and socially, does not infringe 
upon any right held collectively by the public under the public nuisance 
doctrine.375  To begin, the paint is present in private homes, not in any shared 
public space.376  While the presence of lead paint constitutes a substantial 
risk to the health of many individual members of the public, the aggregation 
of such potential harms does not necessarily infringe upon a right held by the 
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public collectively.377  If lead particles spread outside of the home and into 
the public space, as with smoke or dust, plaintiffs may then have a more 
compelling argument that the paint infringed upon a common right because 
the community shares a right to the air.378  Similarly, the poisoning of a well 
would infringe upon a common right to water, and the blocking of a roadway 
would interfere with the public’s right of convenience.379  However, absent 
such a showing, pervasive lead paint contained within private homes does 
not violate an indivisible public right because the public possesses no 
collective right to health in their individual dwellings.380  To hold otherwise 
would be to create a public right against all harms, something the tort was 
never intended to do.381 
As no common right exists, public nuisance claims cannot be brought to 
abate residential lead paint.382  While an attractive and novel theory, the 
public nuisance doctrine should not be employed in the place of other torts 
simply because it is the last available option.383  Individuals can still attempt 
to bring private nuisance actions on their own behalf or another tort claim 
like negligence or products liability if available.  Public entities should 
preserve public nuisance to combat interferences with truly common rights, 
not as a vehicle for restitution of the costs of mitigating a social harm that 
arose from a once-legal product.384 
Future state courts that adjudicate lead paint public nuisance suits should 
dismiss the claims from the outset, following the analysis set forth by the 
Rhode Island Supreme Court.385  The lack of a common right means that 
public nuisance is simply inapposite.  Courts should state such a proposition 
directly, contrary to Illinois and Missouri,386 as doing so will provide 
structure to the often nebulous tort.  Further, a trial judge should make this 
determination, not a jury.387  If there is no common right, there is no public 
nuisance and therefore no need to waste precious judicial resources on a trial.  
The value of the public nuisance doctrine is that it can be employed to combat 
social harms not considered or proscribed proactively;388 however, to 
preserve that value, courts cannot allow the tort to morph into a panacea that 
would swallow the carefully crafted evolution of tort law.389 
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B.  Legislatures Are Better Suited to Tackle This Problem 
Complex social issues should be resolved by legislatures, not by courts 
through the public nuisance doctrine.390  Pervasive lead-based paint in 
residential homes is one such issue.  Nearly every state legislature has 
followed the federal government in passing laws to mitigate the risks of lead 
paint,391 and continued efforts at eradicating the toxin should be within their 
exclusive control.392  While Chief Justice Zazzali was correct that courts 
have a responsibility to modernize the common law,393 they also have a duty 
to ensure that existing law is not employed impermissibly.394  To allow 
recovery in public nuisance lead paint suits not only defies the boundaries of 
the tort but also places the court in the role of decision maker about the 
distribution costs on a major social issue, something which should be a 
legislative function.395 
By and large, the majority of courts that have adjudicated public nuisance 
claims in the course of lead paint litigation have fulfilled their strict 
gatekeeper role396 and have not allowed the tort to stray from its English 
common law roots.397  Beginning with the first major public nuisance suit in 
1971, which attempted to solve the problem of air pollution in Los Angeles, 
through the explosion of public nuisance suits in the last two decades,398 
courts have generally resisted allowing public nuisance to become a vehicle 
by which to usurp the legislative branch.399  With the exception of ConAgra, 
lead paint public nuisance claims have rightly failed.400  As courts face public 
nuisance suits in new contexts—whether global warming, the opioid crisis, 
or some unforeseen mass harm—they should recall the wisdom of the Rhode 
Island Supreme Court in avoiding the siren call of public nuisance:  “This 
Court is bound by the law and can provide justice only to the extent that law 
allows . . . .  This Court is powerless to fashion independently a cause of 
action that would achieve the justice that these children deserve.”401 
CONCLUSION 
Lead-based paint indisputably remains a significant health hazard in the 
United States.  Despite a federal ban on the product almost half a century 
ago, hundreds of thousands of children still suffer from elevated levels of 
lead in their blood and millions more continue to live under such a threat.  
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Time-barred from products liability or negligence claims, numerous states 
have employed the public nuisance doctrine in attempts to hold lead paint 
companies liable for the persisting problem.  With the exception of ConAgra 
in California, all of these attempts have failed—either because the courts 
refused to recognize that the actions of lead paint companies taken decades 
ago interfere with a public right today or because the plaintiffs failed to 
properly allege factual causation, thus allowing the courts to skirt any 
decision on the existence of a public right. 
Recognizing that there are undoubtedly difficulties in defining the 
amorphous boundaries of a “common right” and that lead-based paint is an 
unfortunate pervasive harm, the tort of public nuisance is not the proper tool 
for communities to employ in their abatement efforts.  As understood in the 
common law and through modern American jurisprudence, lead paint in 
private homes does not infringe upon any right commonly held by the public.  
Absent this threshold requirement, public nuisance claims must fail.  Future 
courts that hear public nuisance suits of any nature should follow the example 
set by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in carefully analyzing the historical 
boundaries of the tort to ensure that it does not morph into a remedy for all 
harms. 
